What is the Enlightenment? Investigating the Origins and Ideological Uses of an Historical Category
My title echoes the title of an essay that has as good a claim as any to have actually introduced one of the most pivotal and widespread categories in the study of Western history -Kant's 1784 contribution to the Berlinische Monatsschrift, Beantwortung der Frage: was ist Aufklàrung? [An- swer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?] The context of Kant's essay deserves some description because it engenders questions about the stability, definition, and ideological significance of the term 'the Enlightenment' that I will pursue in this paper. For Kant did not write this essay to prove that he lived in an 'enlightened age/ as he expressly denies.
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Rather he was responding to a debate in the Berlinische Monatsschrift initially sparked by an anonymous essay urging that marriage no longer be performed by the clergy, but be placed entirely in the hands of the state. This opinion sparked a debate in Berlin's free-thinking intellectual monthly, including an essay strongly defending the religious nature of marriage by one Johann Friedrich Zôllner who, despairing of those who pretended to be so 'enlightened,' asked in a footnote, ' Enlighten] , maintained that 'Enlightenment' stood for the rational theory of how to create a culture appropriate to the 'Bestimmung der Menschen' -variously translated as the 'vocation' or (more dubiously) the 'destiny' of men. 3 The second person to reply was Immanuel Kant, who broached an issue also taken up by Mendelssohn, though Kant testifies that he only read Mendelssohn's contribution afterwards: this was the question of whether the 'enlightenment' of individual human beings could conflict with the welfare of the community as a whole. In his Was ist Aufkldrungl, Kant unwittingly concurred with Mendelssohn that this conflict could indeed happen. A judge or clergyman might have to prop up popular prejudice from time to time in order protect civil order. But Kant, with his usual and often rewarding desire to get things nicely into categories, wished to distinguish between the duties of a person as a civil being, which demanded a high degree of conformity with received truth, and the liberties of the same person as a private citizen, which should be left largely untrammeled.
One imagines Kant being surprised to learn that this modest and rather conservative response to a grumpy footnote has come virtually to define the era in which he lived, spawning an industry of scholarly commentary in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries which, ripping his little essay out of its context, remembers it almost exclusively for its inaugural slogan 'Sapere aude,' 'dare to know.' 4 And there is a reason for this use of Was ist Aufklarungl as the supposed manifesto of his era, a reason that goes well beyond the relatively narrow concerns of scholars occupied with understanding the eighteenth century. We do not usually like to dwell on the often covert ideological and political purposes of our ostensibly neutral and objective preconceptions as students of history. Yet, as I will argue, the slow evolution of that relatively modern preconception about eighteenth-century Europe -that this time and place experienced an 'Enlightenment' -has been historically driven by political aims extraneous to the facts of history.
A suggestive place to begin this history of histories of the eighteenth century is at the origin of the English term 'the Enlightenment/ as used as a label for a historical epoch. The relevant definition of 'Enlightenment' in the Oxford English Dictionary, a definition curiously unchanged since 1894, indicates that in the Victorian era this term was both rare and used in a sense very different from our present sense of a distinct historical era or movement. This definition reads, Sometimes used [after Ger. Aufklârung, Aufklarerei] to designate the spirit and aims of the French philosophers of the 18 th c, or of others whom it is intended to associate with them in the implied charge of shallow and pretentious intellectualism, unreasonable contempt for tradition and authority, etc.
The illustrations are drawn from nineteenth-century books on German philosophy by J.H. Sterling and Edward Caird, both of whom use 'Enlightenment' in this largely pejorative and ironic sense to mean the kind of materialist skepticism inherited from the eighteenth century by contemporary writers like Renan, Feuerbach, and Buckle.
5 Both historians contend, moreover, that Kant and later Hegel set out not to perpetuate the 'Enlightenment,' but rather to correct it by re-establishing a respect for metaphysics and positive truth. The rarity of the term 'Enlightenment' is further suggested by J. Sibree's 1899 translation of Hegel's Philosophy of History where the translator notes that 'there is no current term in English denoting' Hegel's word Aufklarung, which he renders not as 'Enlightenment' but as 'éclaircissment.' 6 As this evidence suggests, the provenance of the term 'Enlightenment' is not French, as we might expect, but rather German. During the Victorian period, the most admired English historian of eighteenth-century France, John Morley, never used this word, relying instead on the much narrower term 'Voltairism.' 7 Nor do even French historians of the nineteenth century talk about l'âge' or le siècle des lumières.' To cite the pre-eminent French histories of the eighteenth century, neither term is used in Tocqueville's L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856) while le siècle des lumières' appears but once in Taine's L'Ancien Régime (1876) and there only in a mocking reference to what the philosophes mistakenly thought of themselves. 8 For Taine, like Tocqueville, viewed eighteenthcentury France as a sad prelude to the volatile and self-destructive political situation of the nineteenth century. Among French historians of the early twentieth century, Lanson, Monet, and Hazard evidently never used l'âge des lumières' nor thought of that age as especially illuminated.
It was the Germans, who some modern historians deny really experienced an 'Enlightenment' at all, who first made systematic use of this term to describe a bounded period of time characterized by rational thought, the decline of superstition, and the rise of political liberties. Such is the depiction of the Aufklarung in Hegel's The Philosophy of History, and his categorization of the eighteenth century as a unified epoch of philosophical and political progress was later adopted by materialist Young Hegelians like Feuerbach. For the Young Hegelians, who rejected both Hegel's idealism and his ultimate political conservatism, the Aufklarung became a rallying cry, for it represented a golden era to be recovered in the joint causes of political liberation and national unity during the years leading to the 1848 revolution. 9 In Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert, published in 1879 and for a long time a standard German history of the eighteenth century, the former Young Hegelian Hermann Hettner uses the term Aufklarung systematically to describe an era that remained a shining example of philosophical enlightenment and literary accomplishment. Much to the disgruntlement of his fellow liberals, Hettner lauded the blacksmith of German unity after 1871, Bismark, as the epigone of that previous strong-armed ruler, William the Great. In Hettner's enthused imagination, the new Prussian unifier, like the past one, would preside over a renaissance of German letters.
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How do we account for the fact that something close to our modern notion of the Enlightenment first emerged not in France and England, which most historians now regard as the sources of this period's intellectual climate, but rather in Germany? To answer this question, we must refer to the historiographical style and political atmosphere of nineteenth-century Germany rather than to any singular talent among its historians. The conceptualization of the eighteenth century as a discrete and homogeneous period seems to have something to do, first, with the style of history influenced by Hegel, for Germans were for a long time more comfortable than either the English or the French with dividing history into distinct epochs. As suggested before, moreover, the Aufkl'drung served an important function in political and nationalistic discourse in the nineteenth century: the German Enlightenment both confirmed Germany's membership in the community of great European nations while also, with the Aufklarung's distinct character and literary heroes, serving as a communal reference point during Germany's long march towards nationhood. Neither of these concerns drove historical discussion in France and England.
The German preoccupation with the Enlightenment, moreover, became even more complex and politicized during the first thirty-five years of the twentieth century. There were dozens of German books about the Enlightenment published during this era -a trend so pronounced that the absence of much mention of the Enlightenment in some significant historical publications of this time, such as Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West, seems itself worthy of comment. The immense popularity of Spengler's tract, published in 1919, is usually attributed to the upsurge of irrationalism, relativism, and pessimism in post-war Germany, and indeed somewhat less starkly throughout Europe and America during the interbellum. As such a dark mood clearly conflicted with the ideals of rationalism, confidence, and progress usually associated with the Enlightenment, it is hardly surprising that Spengler's jeremiad gives short-shrift to the eighteenth century. Spengler interestingly prefigures recent conservative authors like Samuel P. Huntington, the author of the Clash of Civilizations (1996) , in separating the alleged greatness of the 'West' from any particular 'Enlightenment': the West, suggest both authors, is great not because it experienced any particular improvement in the eighteenth century, but because the Western tradition has always been inherently (even racially) superior to the 'civilizations' that will ultimately overwhelm it. Nor is it surprising that his rationalist and liberal opponents rushed to defend this period as an era of both illumination and German greatness. A whole series of books argued this position, 11 but none more influentially than Ernst Cassirer's Die Philoso-phie der Aufklârung, first published in 1931, but not translated into English until 1951. In defending the Enlightenment, and in particular the German Enlightenment, as a period that nobly sought to align human reason with the realties of nature, giving rise to a unified intellectual movement that reached a world-historic apogee in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Cassirer was not merely advancing a scholarly riposte to skeptics of this period. As a Jewish liberal intellectual, increasingly embattled in a bitter and increasingly anti-semitic Germany, he set out on the implicitly political mission of refocusing German pride on the supposed liberalism and rationalism of the Aufklârung.
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In the meantime, and in the future home of Enlightenment studies, the United States, the term 'Enlightenment' had begun to seep into scholarly language. In 1910, a Princeton Professor named John Grier Hibben published a book called The Philosophy of the Enlightenment which seems highly indebted to German scholarship. In 1931, another American, Norman Lewis Torrey, produced an enthusiastic appraisal of the French eighteenth century entitled Voltaire and the Enlightenment. Without comparison, however, the most influential American book on the eighteenth century during the first half of the twentieth century was The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (1932), by the John Wendell Anderson Professor of History at Cornell, Carl Lotus Becker (who, despite his Germanic name, came not from Germany but from Kansas). The tale of Becker's career points a moral to all of us about the vanity of scholarly wishes. He was a fine historian specializing in Jefferson and the American Revolution, and he enjoyed the reputation of being virtually the dean of American historians during the 1930s and 1940s. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, his most popular book, sold about 2,500 copies during the first decade after its publication, and a further 5,500 copies during the following decades. 1956 wanted firm rational truths of a liberal provenance, and they did not want these truths to be confused with doctrines at this point aligned in varying shades of clarity with their enemies: Fascism, Christianity, and faith religions in general. Nonetheless, the skepticism embodied by Carl Becker endured during the post-war period, though with various new ideological inflections. As we have seen, arguments unsympathetic to eighteenth-century 'Enlightenment' had proliferated since the nineteenth century, though their orientation had tended to be philosophically and politically conservative. With the experience of Nazism and the Holocaust, however, one branch of liberals began to raise doubts about the ultimate historical virtues of what they called the Enlightenment. Among these doubting liberals was, significantly, Ernst Cassirer. At the conference at Colgate University in 1956, Cassirer's The Philososphy of the Enlightenment, first translated five years earlier, was repeatedly lauded as the best corrective to Becker's Heavenly City. 18 A decade later, in the first of his two-volume study of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay stated that 'my greatest debt is to the writings of Ernst Cassirer.'
19 Yet the book Cassirer wrote at the end of his life as a refugee in wartime New York City, Myth and the State, reveals a significant change of heart. The Nazis, wrote Cassirer, had combined the regressive and mystifying powers of myth with technological advances and the methodological precision made possible by the Enlightenment. 20 And if Cassirer found the Enlightenment partly guilty for the draconian evil of the Nazis, his fellow German-Jewish exiles in America, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, placed the guilt of Nazism fully at the door of Voltaire and his friends. In The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) , written during the same years as Cassirer's Myth and the State, these scholars from the Frankfurt School portrayed the Aufklarung as propounding a rationalist dogma entirely without capacity for self-criticism, and therefore bearing a potential for the massively efficient and dehumanizing myth-making perfected jointly by the American 'culture industry' and Nazi propaganda. In the post-war period, therefore, liberal pitched against liberal in a debate about both the nature of the Enlightenment and its historical fallout. This was a debate with real ideological stakes, provoking serious political passions. Peter Gay, like Cassirer, Horkheimer, and Adorno, had come to the United States in the 1930s as a refugee from Nazi anti-Semitism, subsequently changing his name from Peter Frôlich in a conscious effort, as he admits in his autobiography My German Question, to shed his German past and to re-create himself as a liberal American.
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Gay's highly influential two-volume The Enlightenment, published between 1966 and 1969, is a barely disguised defense of an optimistic secular liberalism opposed both to pessimism about Western civilization and to what he, perhaps prophetically, regarded as the rising conservatism of his adopted nation -a trend he associated particularly with the pernicious influence of Christianity. Gay's philosophes are, above all, heroic anti-Christians, champions of Gay's favorite virtue, 'decency,' against persecuting eighteenth-century Christian zealots who sound in his book a lot like Nazis. 23 On the other hand, fellow American liberals like Lester Crocker and Louis Bredvold wrote books on the Enlightenment lamenting the breakdown of civilization as the result of the Kafkaesque systematizing of the modern age inaugurated by the Enlightenment.
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For all their differences, however, these post-World War II scholars had certain premises in common. Most obviously, they believed that something they called the 'Enlightenment' had actually happened during the eighteenth century, though they disagreed widely about the nature of this event. It is, moreover, of considerable significance that the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, first published in German in 1959 and then translated into English amidst a liberal backlash against the Enlightenment during the 1980s, Koselleck argues that the separation of bourgeois moral critique from the supposed realm of 'polities' during the Enlightenment ensured that the epigones of this revolution would uncritically, and fatally, understand themselves as 'moral' rather than 'political' agents. 27 Similarly, the American champion of Victorian morality, Gertude Himmelfarb, the (even) biological mother of neo-conservative notable Irving Kristol, celebrates in a new book the solid conservative virtues of the English and American 'Enlightenments' against the disruptive and preening lumières across the English Channel. 28 So, what of us who actually weave at the loom of eighteenth-century history? It seems to me that the upshot of this history of histories of our specialty is both cautionary and empowering. The moral is cautionary because the category of the 'Enlightenment' has in fact little of the stability and certainty that we are apt to ascribe to it: virtually all the historians whom I have mentioned have disagreed vastly about what the 'Enlightenment' means. Moreover, their underlying assumption that we can characterize an entire period under a single label denoting a specific set of attitudes surely raises serious historiographical problems that we need to ponder. We also need to think about what, perhaps, is motivating us to portray this supposed Enlightenment as we do, for the history of studies of this period has been expressly driven by ideological, political, and nationalistic motives. On the other hand, we eighteenthcentury scholars might also indulge a sensation of empowerment. What we say about the eighteenth century in fact matters outside our offices and lecture-rooms, for the idea of the Enlightenment, however ill-informed, has shaped and continues to shape how the Western public and its leaders think and behave. As we debate and inform each other about the eighteenth century here and elsewhere, we may be influencing the world rather more than we suspect.
